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NOTES
Bankruptcy Law-The Continued Vitality of the Six-Months
Rule in Railroad Receiverships
One hundred years have passed since the United States Supreme
Court in Fosdick v. Schall' first set forth the six-months rule for estab-
lishing creditors' priorities in railroad receiverships. The rule, as pro-
nounced by the Fosdick Court and amplified in subsequent decisions,
gives priority in payment to unsecured creditors who, within a period
of six months prior to the initiation of reorganization proceedings, 2
supply materials or services necessary to the continued operation of the
railroad.3 In recent years the rule has been in issue in litigation arising
out of receiverships involving the Penn Central Transportation Com-
pany,4 the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company,5
and the Tennessee Central Railway Company.' In the ongoing Penn
Central reorganization, for example, claims under the six-months rule
total some $62.5 million.7
Despite its continuing importance, the six-months rule has been
inconsistently applied during its century of development.' The courts,
1. 99 U.S. 235 (1878).
2. The rule is applicable in appropriate railroad reorganization proceedings by virtue of sec-
tion 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1970), which provides:
For all purposes of this section unsecured claims, which would have been entitled to
priority if a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor had been appointed by a
Federal court on the day of the approval of the petition, shall be entitled to such priority
and the holders of such claims shall be treated as a separate class or classes of creditors.
3. Although the Supreme Court has never applied the rule outside the railroad receivership
context, the lower federal courts have employed the rule in cases involving public or quasi-public
corporations. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY 9.13[5], at 1633 (14th ed. J. Moore 1978); see, e.g.,
In re Madison Ry., 115 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1940); Crane Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 238 F. 693 (9th
Cir. 1916), cer. denied, 244 U.S. 658 (1917); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Memphis Gaslight Co., 125 F.
97 (6th Cir. 1903).
4. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 21, 1970).
5. See In re New York, N.H. & H.RR., 278 F. Supp. 592 (D. Conn. 1967), afd, 405 F.2d
50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
6. See In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 463 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
7. Affidavit of Aidan Mullett at 11, In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed
June 20, 1970).
8. See In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 138 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd per curiam,
230 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1956), where the court stated: "The researches of counsel supplemented by
such research as has been at my command have not resulted in the discovery of any principle
which would account for all of the decisions or even enough of the decisions so that one might say
there was a principle behind them." Id. at 625.
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particularly in recent years, have frequently applied the rule mechani-
cally, without sufficiently analyzing the particular questions before
them in relation to the underlying rationale of the rule. This has cre-
ated confusion concerning the application of the rule and resulted in a
number of issues that are in need of resolution.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
The six-months rule is an equitable doctrine that first appeared in
a federal equity receivership,9 Fosdick v. Schall. In that case the
Supreme Court recognized that the business of all railroad companies
is done, to a greater or lesser extent, on credit.' 0 When railroad com-
panies encounter financial difficulties, current debts for labor, supplies
and equipment are often allowed to accumulate so that mortgage pay-
ments may be made and a foreclosure postponed, if not avoided.1
The Court found this process to be inequitable because: "Every rail-
road mortgagee in accepting his security impliedly agrees that the cur-
rent debts made in the ordinary course of business shall be paid from
the current receipts before he has any claim upon the income."' 2 The
Supreme Court went on to hold that claims of prereceivership opera-
tions creditors' 3 were entitled to priority with respect to receivership
income, even though that income was subject to the lien of the rail-
road's underlying mortgage if, during or immediately prior to the re-
ceivership, income had been diverted to the benefit of the mortgagees. 14
Equity required that the mortgagees restore any such "diversions" to
the "current debt fund."' 5  The Court reasoned that every railroad
mortgagee impliedly agrees that current debts shall be paid first from
current receipts, because without operating creditors no income at all
9. The federal equity receivership was the precursor of the reorganization procedures now
applied under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). Generally, a creditor of
a financially distressed railroad would file a creditor's bill in federal court asking that a receiver-
ship of the property of the debtor be instituted. Once the receivership was commenced, the
debtor was protected from the attacks of subsequent creditors, and its business was continued
under the control of the receiver in order that all debts might be paid in an orderly fashion. The
formal function of the receivership was ended when the property of the debtor was sold by the
court to pay, to the extent possible, the claims of the creditors. See generally COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 3, 0.04.
10. 99 U.S. at 252.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. An "operations creditor" may be defined as an unsecured creditor who supplied labor or
materials necessary to the continued operation of the railroad. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
.rura note 3, 9.13[5], at 1635 & n.38.
14. 99 U.S. at 252-53.
15. Id.
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would be produced and the value of the mortgage would be considera-
bly undermined.'6
In Burnham -. Bowen,17 the Supreme Court expanded upon the
Fosdick doctrine, declaring that current income itself, whether col-
lected prior to or during the receivership and regardless of diversions,
was encumbered by current debts arising out of the operations of the
railroad that produced the income." Thus, the Court held that current
debts should be paid first, out of either prereceivership or receivership
income.' 9 The Burnham Court also held that if diversions to the bene-
fit of the mortgagees from current income occurred, the current creditor
could have resort to the corpus of the mortgaged property to the extent
of the diversions.20 Further, the current creditor could insist on a sale
of the property to the extent of the diversions if he had not been paid.2'
Despite the Burnham Court's expansion of the Fosdick rule, the
Supreme Court did not intend to give current creditors an unqualified
priority over mortgagees. In Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust
Co. ,22 the Court restricted the application of the six-months rule by
emphasizing that the priority of mortgage liens over the corpus should
ordinarily be displaced only when diversions had occurred. 23 The
Court reprimanded those lower courts that had liberally allowed inva-
sions of the corpus of mortgaged property in order to satisfy the claims
of current creditors, stating: "[Tihe appointment of a receiver vests in
the court no absolute control over the property, and no general author-
ity to displace vested liens. . . .It is the exception and not the rule that
such priority of liens can be displaced."'24
16. See Burnham v. Bowen, Ill U.S. 776, 780 (1884).
17. 111 U.S. 776 (1884).
18. Id. at 780-81.
19. Id. at 782. See also Virginia & Ala. Coal Co. v. Central R.R. & Banking Co., 170 U.S.
355, 365, 369 (1898). Receivership income is, however, first devoted to the expenses of the receiv-
ership. COLLIFR ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, 0.04, at 40.
20. 111 U.S. at 782.
21. Id. at 782-83. In a later case, St. Louis, A. & T.H.R.R. v. Cleveland, C., C. & I. Ry., 125
U.S. 658 (1888), the Court explained that the current creditor must show as a condition precedent
to its right to resort to the corpus that the diversion occurred after the railroad became indebted to
it. Id. at 672.
22. 136 U.S. 89 (1890).
23. The priority of the mortgage lien may also be displaced through rare application of the
necessity of payment rule. See note 30 infra. See also Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197
U.S. 183 (1905); Miltenbrrger v. Logansport Ry., 106 U.S. 286 (1882); Moore v. Donahoo, 217 F.
177 (9th Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 706 (1915); Carbon Fuel Co. v. Chicago, C. & L.R.R.,
202 F. 172 (7th Cir. 1912).
24. 136 U.S. at 97-98.
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In Southern Railway v. Carnegie Steel Co. ,25 the Supreme Court,
after reviewing its earlier cases dealing with the current creditors' prior-
ity,26 defined the class of creditors entitled to assert the priority as in-
cluding only those creditors who supplied materials and services
necessary to the operation of the railroad in reliance upon the current
income of the railroad, as opposed to its general credit, for payment.27
Thus, in Southern Railway the Court granted priority to a supplier of
steel rails, while in Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.,28 decided the same day as Southern Railway, the Court de-
nied priority to another supplier of steel rails because the latter supplier
had relied on the general credit rather than the current income of the
railroad.29
The Supreme Court's development of the six-months rule
culminated in Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co.3" In Gregg, a creditor
who had supplied a small quantity of railroad ties shortly before receiv-
ership proceedings began sought to have his debt satisfied from the
corpus of the estate. Although the Court recognized that the claimant
had a valid equitable lien on current income in the hands of the re-
ceiver, it found that no such fund of surplus earnings existed." More-
over, the Court found that no diversions had occurred by which the
mortgagees had profited.32  This finding affirmed the court of appeals'
holding33 that no diversion had occurred when payments on capital
improvements and other expense items that benefited the mortgagees
were more than matched by funds obtained by the railroad through
borrowings and receipts not considered to be part of current railroad
25. 176 U.S. 257 (1900).
26. Id. at 273-86.
27. Id. at 286.
28. 176 U.S. 298 (1900).
29. Id. at 316-17. See also Virginia & Ala. Coal Co. v. Central R.R. & Banking Co., 170
U.S. 355, 365 (1898).
30. 197 U.S. 183 (1905). The Gregg decision restricts the necessity of payment rule estab-
lished in Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry., 106 U.S. 286 (1882). The necessity of payment rule
allows the receiver to make distributions to current creditors out of the corpus regardless of
whether there have been any diversions to the benefit of the mortgagees. Id. at 312-13. Gregg
limited this power to the extraordinary circumstance in which payment of the claim is indispens-
able to the business of the railroad, as when the claimant supplies essential and otherwise unob-
tainable materials and threatens to cut off the railroad's supply if not paid. 197 U.S. at 187. See,
e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. Chicago, C. & L.R.R., 202 F. 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1912).
31. 197 U.S. at 188; see Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 124 F. 721, 721 (6th Cir. 1903),
aftd, 197 U.S. 183 (1905).
32. 197 U.S. at 186.
33. 124 F. 721 (6th Cir. 1903), at'd, 197 U.S. 183 (1905).
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income.34 Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied any priority to the
six-months claimant.3 5
These early Supreme Court decisions clearly set out the broad
framework of the six-months rule. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in a frequently cited passage from its opinion in Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. Albia Coal Co.,36 reduced that framework to three
requirements:
(1) That the consideration for the claim was a current expense of
ordinary operation of the railroad, necessarily incurred to keep it a
going concern.
(2) That the claim represents a debt contracted with the expectation
or intention of the parties that it was to be paid out of the current
earnings of the railroad.
(3) That the claim shall have accrued within six months prior to the
appointment of the receiver.37
Within this broad framework, however, courts have varied consid-
erably in their applications of the rule. In Southern Railway the
Supreme Court recognized that its own cases failed to lay down any
clearly definable or uniformly applied rule.38 It is not surprising, then,
that subsequent lower court decisions have left a number of issues un-
resolved.
THE EQUITABLE BASIS OF THE RULE
Several of the early Supreme Court decisions suggest that the basis
in equity of the six-months priority is that the current creditors have
protected the value of the mortgagees' security by keeping the railroad
running.39  Accordingly, the trustees of the Penn Central Transporta-
tion Company argue in that railroad's current reorganization proceed-
ing that
34. Id. at 727.
35. See 197 U.S. at 189.
36. 36 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1929).
37. Id. at 35. The requirement that the claim have accrued within six months was not
always strictly applied in the early cases. See St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Spiller, 274 U.S. 304, 311
(1927). The origin of the six month period as a limitation is unclear. See, e.g., Westinghouse Air
Brake Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 137 F. 26 (8th Cir. 1905) (six month period needed to avoid
secret liens); FitzGibbon, The Present Status of the Six Months' Rule, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 230,
240-41 (1934) (six months period borrowed from Illinois statute).
38. 176 U.S. at 285.
39. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U.S. 434,455 (1886); Burnham v.
Bowen, 111 U.S. 776, 780 (1884); Union Trust Co. v. Souther, 107 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1882). See
also In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 405 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999
(1969).
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the six months' priority is premised upon the granting of some spe-
cial benefit or enrichment by operations creditors in the six-month
period prior to bankruptcy, and on the receiving of that benefit or
enrichment by other creditors who therefore can be expected to bear
the burden of compensatory special treatment for the operations
creditors. 40
If, however, the continued operation of the railroad has served only to
decrease the value of the mortgagees' security through extensive oper-
ating losses, the trustees conclude that there is no equitable reason to
give priority to the six-months creditors over the mortgage liens.4 '
The trustees' analysis, however, fails to account for the cases that
have refused to apply the six-months rule in reorganizations of private
corporations other than railroads.42 As these cases illustrate, the basis
of the rule is the significant public interest in the continued operation of
the railroads.43 In ordinary receiverships, the only interests at stake
are those of the mortgagees and the various claimants; in railroad re-
ceiverships, the public's interest in continued railroad operation is par-
amount. Given the often tenuous financial condition of railroads,
frequently complicated by a heavy mortgage burden,' it would in
many cases be difficult for railroads to obtain the materials and labor
necessary for operation if railroads offered only their general credit as
security for operating creditors. Public policy therefore demands that
these claimants be given assurances of payment in the event of a bank-
ruptcy.
The Supreme Court's "implied agreement ' 4 in Fosdick v. Schall
is best seen as an unconvincing rationalization by the Court for its, at
that time, novel derogation of the mortgage liens.46  The equities of
current creditors' claims are the same whether the corporation in re-
ceivership is of public or merely private concern; it is the public interest
in the continued operation of the nation's railroads that justifies the six-
months rule's unique reordering of receivership priorities. 47 Thus, the
40. Memorandum in Support of Trustees' Position with Respect to Six Months' Claims at 1,
In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 20, 1970).
41. Id. at 2.
42. See In re Pusey & Jones Corp., 295 F.2d 479, 480 (3d Cir. 1961). But see Dudley v.
Mealey, 147 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1945).
43. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 208 F. 168, 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1913), aff'd, 216 F. 458 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 632 (1915). But see Gregg v. Mer-
cantile Trust Co., 109 F. 220, 227-28 (6th Cir. 1901).
44. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 20, 1970).
45. See text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
46. See Wham, Preference in Railroad Receivershios, 23 ILL. L. REV. 141, 142-43 (1928).
47. Even when courts have considered the issue of benefit, they have often assumed that the
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only equitable condition precedent for the application of the rule is that
the materials or services provided by the claimant be necessary to the
continued operation of the railroad.
CURRENT OPERATING EXPENSES
In order to qualify for the six-months priority, a claim must be
based on a current expense arising from the ordinary operation of the
railroad.48  Materials and supplies directly associated with the opera-
tion of a railroad, such as rails or ties for normal track maintenance,
fuel, power and normal replacements for worn-out equipment, along
with the services associated with the provision of such materials, clearly
qualify as current expenses.49
Purchases of new equipment and new construction, as distin-
guished from repairs, however, do not fall within the preferred class of
claims, no matter how imperative the need therefor.50  The cases sug-
gest that the distinction lies in whether additions to equipment are be-
ing made, and whether the repairs merely restore the damaged
property or serve to improve its quality.5'
If the justification for the six-months priority rests upon the public
interest in the continued operation of the railroad, however, the test
ought to be whether the expense was necessary and proximately related
to the physical operation of the road. Thus, a supplier of new cars
needed to replace aged, deteriorated cars should be entitled to the pro-
tection of the six-months priority. A railroad should not be forced by its
search for credit to undertake stopgap repairs in lieu of buying new
continued operation of the railroad has benefited the value of the mortgagees' security. See, e.g.,
In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), vacated on other grounds,
463 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972). This assumption rests on the theory that
a forced sale of a nonoperating railroad would obtain a reduced price as compared to a similar
sale of an operating property. For example, the good will attendant to an operating railroad
would presumably not be a factor in the sale of a railroad that had earlier ceased operations.
Although this assumption has been criticized as unrealistic given the possibility of an early reor-
ganization before the railroad's financial difficulties become so acute as to force the cessation of
operations, see In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 278 F. Supp. 592, 598 n.10 (D. Conn. 1967),
aI'd, 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969), no court has yet rejected a six-
months claim on the ground that the claimant produced no benefit to the mortgage creditors.
48. See FitzGibbon, supra note 37, at 235-38.
49. Id. Priority has been denied, however, to many items normally included in any ac-
counting methodology as operating expenses. This category includes tort claims, see, e.g., St.
Louis Trust Co. v. Riley, 70 F. 32 (8th Cir. 1895), debts for special legal services, the printing of
time tables, and premium payments for general liability insurance. See FitzGibbon, supra note
37, at 236-37.
50. See Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 176 U.S. at 315.
51. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 238 F. 693, 698 (9th Cir. 1916), cert. denied,
244 U.S. 658 (1917).
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equipment. The six-months rule should, in any event, be strictly ap-
plied to avoid unnecessary invasions of the vested contract rights of
railroad mortgagees.52 The courts ought to examine carefully whether
the asserted expense was indeed necessary; the rule should not serve to
subsidize the unwise expansion of a financially unstable railroad.
RELIANCE ON CURRENT OPERATING INCOME
As a further prerequisite for the six-months priority, a claimant
must demonstrate reliance on the current operating income of the rail-
road for payment, as opposed to reliance on the general credit of the
corporation.53 The six-months rule is designed to allow the railroad to
acquire materials and supplies that creditors would otherwise be reluc-
tant to sell because of a lack of security. Thus, when a claimant relies
on some form of security other than the generalized hope that railroad
operations will generate sufficient income to pay current debts, it
should not be entitled to the six-months priority. The claimant's reli-
ance upon the railway's general credit is determined by reference to the
amount of the debt, the time and terms of payment, and all other cir-
cumstances attending the transaction.54 It is not necessary to provide
direct evidence 9f the parties' expectation that the suppliers would be
paid out of current earnings."
Reliance on current income is perhaps best defined by way of con-
trast, in terms of those factors that indicate a reliance upon the general
credit of the railroad. When a claimant receives security, it is pre-
sumed that it relied upon the security and not upon current earnings. 56
Further, when payment is unreasonably deferred, it is presumed that
reliance was based upon the long-term financial condition of the com-
pany.57  Also, an unusually large expenditure, out of the ordinary
course of business of the railroad, may indicate that the general credit
of the railroad, rather than its current income, was relied upon.58
52. See Johnson Fare Box Co. v. Doyle, 250 F.2d 656, 657 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 938 (1958); Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co., 136 U.S. at 97-98.
53. See, e.g., Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 176 U.S. at 316-
17.
54. Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U.S. at 285.
55. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 216 F. 458, 471 (2d Cir. 1914), cert.
denied, 238 U.S. 632 (1915).
56. See Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95, 112 (1893).
57. E.g., Bound v. South Carolina Ry., 58 F. 473, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1893) (payment deferred
for eight months).
58. E.g., Rodger Ballast Car Co. v. Omaha, K.C. & E.R.R., 154 F. 629, 633 (8th Cir. 1907).
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It is not fatal to a current creditor's six-months claim, however, to
have taken the notes of the railroad debtor. In Southern Railway the
Supreme Court, emphasizing the small quantity of materials supplied
in that case and the short credit terms of the transaction, granted prior-
ity to a six-months claimant even though the claimant took the debtor's
promissory note. As the Court recognized, the use of the notes merely
showed that the creditor preferred to have its debt evidenced by negoti-
able commercial paper rather than to stand on open account.59
THE CURRENT DEBT FUND
The six-months priority attaches first to the current debt fund, also
known as the current expense fund.60 Surprisingly, in the one hundred
years during which case law concerning the six-months rule has devel-
oped, only one court has sought to define the current debt fund.61 In
In re New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,62 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit stated:
We hold that the availability of a current expense fund under the six-
months rule is to be determined by generally accepted accounting
practices, including those prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and that under those practices the current expense fund
is to be computed by deducting operating expenses and depreciation
from operating revenues.63
The Interstate Commerce Commission Annual Reports and generally
accepted accounting practices, upon which the New Haven court relied
in defining the current debt fund,64 are based on accrual accounting
59. 176 U.S. at 290.
60. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Albia Coal Co., 36 F.2d at 35. In theory, the priority could
attach first to the unmortgaged property of the railroad. See Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York
City Ry., 208 F.168 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), aft'd, 216 F. 458 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 632
(1915). It is unlikely, however, that the modem railroad forced into reorganization will have any
unmortgaged assets. It certainly will not have unmortgaged assets sufficient to satisfy all its six-
months creditors. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 20, 1970).
61. Many of the cases speak of the income available to satisfy the six-months claims and the
corpus, to the extent that it may be invaded by the six-months creditors, as together constituting
the current debt fund. See, e.g., In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 405 F.2d 50,52 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969). In this Note, however, the two sources of funds will be dis-
cussed separately. In this section, the focus will be on determining the existence of an income
fund.
62. 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
63. Id. at 52.
64. The Supreme Court has used a variety of terms in referring to the current debt fund: net
earnings, Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U.S. at 285; income, Virginia & Ala. Coal Co. v.
Central R.R. & Banking Co., 170 U.S. 355, 368 (1898); surplus earnings, Kneeland v. American
Loan & Trust Co., 136 U.S. at 96; current income, St. Louis, A. & T.R.R. v. Cleveland, C., C. & I.
Ry., 125 U.S. 658, 673 (1888); current earnings, Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U.S. at 780; and current
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principles. Accrual accounting reflects receivables and expenses as
they are earned or owed, rather than as they are paid.65 Thus, the
accrual accounting system reflects the actual financial position of the
railroad over an extended period of time.
The six-months claimant is, by definition, a short-term creditor; he
does not look to the complete, actual financial position of the debtor
railroad but to something more akin to its short-term cash flow posi-
tion. The accrual accounting method, therefore, unduly penalizes six-
months creditors. If the existence of a current debt fund is determined
by accrual accounting methods, the fund to which the priority of six-
months claimants may attach will be reduced by the amount of their
claims even though those debts have not yet been paid. This occurs
because, in order to reach net income, expenses are deducted from rev-
enues as those expenses are incurred, not as they are paid.
In rejecting the argument that accrual accounting principles
should not apply in determining the availability of a current debt fund,
the court in New Haven stated that the six-months creditors, at the time
they supplied the materials or services to the debtor railroad, had no
right to expect that accrued expenses would not be paid.6 6  The six-
months creditors, however, might well expect that their claims would
be given priority over all other unpaid debts and "paper" expenses in
the current income of the railroad.67 Certainly, the inclusion of paper
transactions such as depreciation in the calculation of expenses exacer-
bates the failure to reflect properly the nature of the six-months rule.
Since the six-months creditor must rely upon the railroad's short-term
ability to pay its current debts, the reduction of the current expense
fund by a noncash item such as depreciation, which does not directly
impair the railroad's short-term cash or current receipts position, is im-
proper.
receipts, Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. at 252. These terms do not, however, adequately define the
accounting basis for determining whether a current debt fund exists.
In In re New Hope & Ivyland R.R., 353 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the court defined
current income as the "excess of current receipts over current expenses." This does not, however,
establish whether an accrual or a cash method of accounting should be used or what expenses
should be considered current expenses. It was not necessary for the court in New Hope to reach
these issues because it denied the six-months priority on the ground that the railroad was acquir-
ing a capital asset.
65. H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 89 (1968).
66. 405 F.2d at 52.
67. Cf. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95 (1893) (six-months claimants must rely
"upon the interposition of a court of equity").
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It would be erroneous, however, to say that the current debt fund
should be defined simply as the cash and current receipts of the rail-
road. That definition does not recognize that the six-months priority
can only attach to cash and current receipts on hand-the six-months
rule makes no provision for the return of monies already paid out to
other current creditors. To define the current debt fund, therefore, as
the total of the railroad's cash and current receipts during the applica-
ble period is to overvalue the fund. The current debt fund is better
defined as the cash and current receipts on hand to pay current debts.
This definition is supported by a statement of the Supreme Court in
Gregg: "It is agreed that the petitioner may have a claim against sur-
plus earnings, if any, in the hands of the receiver .... -68 The Gregg
Court thus seemed to imply that the current debt fund to which the six-
months claimant has priority consists of the earnings on hand, rather
than the net financial position of the railroad.
69
INVASIONS OF CORPUS
Assuming that the current debt fund, however defined, is insuffi-
cient to satisfy all the six-months claims, the six-months creditors may,
in certain circumstances, look to the corpus of the mortgaged property.
The general rule as to invasions of the corpus in order to pay properly
qualified six-months claims was firmly established by the Supreme
Court in Gregg, in which the Court held that the corpus of the mort-
gaged property could ordinarily be charged with the six-months claims
only if, and to the extent that, there had been diversions from income to
the benefit of the mortgagees.7°
The Supreme Court had earlier defined "diversion" as the pay-
ment of mortgage interest, the purchase of new equipment, or the ac-
quisition of valuable additions out of the earnings which ought, in
68. 197 U.S. at 188.
69. In terms of generally accepted accounting principles, perhaps the closest analog to the
suggested definition would be the statement of changes in financial position, which reflects work-
ing capital flow. See J. SMITH & K. SKOUSEN, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 680, 684 (1977).
This statement is of primary importance to the short-term creditor as it reveals the financial re-
sources that will be available within a short period of time for debt payment. R. ScrHArxK, H.
JENsEN & V. BAN, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 12 (1974). Funds from borrowings should be ex-
cluded from any definition of current debt fund in that they do not represent earnings or income
from the operations of the railroad.
70. 197 U.S. at 186-87. The corpus may also be invaded in order to pay current creditors
under the necessity of payment rule. See note 30 supra. It is clear that the necessity of payment
rule can have no relevance after the railroad has ceased operations, as is the case in the current
Penn Central proceedings. See Moore v. Donahoo, 217 F. 177, 182 (9th Cir. 1914), cert. denied,
235 U.S. 706 (1915) (necessity of payment rule premised on creditor's ability to halt operations).
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equity, to have been dedicated to current debts.7' Thus, payments for
the benefit of mortgagees out of income that should have been devoted
to reduction of current debt give rise to a right in current creditors to
invade the corpus to the extent of the diversion. Taxes paid, however,
even though they redound to the benefit of the mortgagees, do not con-
stitute a diversion.72 In addition, diversions that occurred prior to the
creation of the six-months creditor's debt claim confer no right to in-
vade the corpus because the creditor at that time had no special equity
in current earnings.73
The Supreme Court's decision in Gregg established that when
payments for the benefit of mortgagees are offset by "free funds"-
capital funds derived from sources not connected with the operation of
the railroad, such as investments or borrowings-no diversion has oc-
curred.74 Although this proposition has not been discussed in any re-
cent case, it is based on sound logic as long as the free funds are
regarded as reimbursement pro tanto to the fund subject to the six-
months claims.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Gregg that there can be
no invasion of the corpus in order to satisfy six-months claims unless
there previously has been a diversion from current earnings to the ben-
efit of mortgagees, a line of cases in the Fourth Circuit has developed a
current creditor's right to invade the corpus regardless of diversions.75
In Southern Railway v. Flournoy,76 the court held that income diversion
to mortgagees is not a prerequisite to corpus invasion "where there are
found-as special circumstances-all elements constituting the pre-em-
inent equity. ' 77  The Flournoy court, however, apparently confused
the six-months rule with the necessity of payment rule.78 The necessity
of payment rule, as set forth in Gregg, allows invasions of corpus with-
out any prior diversions only in the extraordinary situation in which
actual payment of the claim is essential to the continued operation of
71. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. at 253.
72. Texas Co. v. International & G.N. Ry., 237 F. 921 (5th Cir. 1916).
73. Fordyce v. Omaha, K.C. & E.R.R., 145 F. 544 (W.D. Mo. 1906).
74. See Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197 U.S. 183 (1905), af'g 124 F. 721 (6th Cir.
1903).
75. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Flournoy, 301 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1962); Virginia Passenger &
Power Co. v. Lane Bros., 174 F. 513 (4th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 610 (1910); Finance Co.
v. Charleston, C. & C.R.R., 62 F. 205 (4th Cir. 1894).
76. 301 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1962).
77. Id. at 851.
78. See In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 278 F. Supp. at 602-03 n.15.
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the road.79 The special circumstances alluded to in the Flournoy deci-
sion" did not meet this standard. Thus the case, and the attendant
Fourth Circuit line of decisions, must be regarded as wrongly decided.
It is unclear how depreciation should be regarded for purposes of
the six-months rule. A diversion, as noted above, may be defined as
any payment that enhances the interests of the mortgagees. Con-
versely, depreciation represents the decreasing value of the mortgage
corpus over time. The question arises, then, whether depreciation
should properly be regarded as an offset to diversionary amounts spent
on additions and improvements by the debtor railroad. In the New
Haven case, the district court held that operating creditors have no eq-
uitable claim on revenues to the extent of depreciation, asserting that
such creditors have no equitable right to be protected from the eco-
nomic fact of depreciation. 8' In an earlier case, Flint v. Danbury &
Bethel Street Railway,8" however, the Connecticut Supreme Court re-
jected an attempt by mortgagees to offset diversions for interest pay-
ments with depreciation expenses. In effect, the court held this would
dedicate current earnings to the mortgagees to the extent of deprecia-
tion, contrary to the equitable principles of the rule.83
In this context it is important to note that it is the addition or bet-
terment that constitutes the enhancement of mortgaged property and,
hence, the diversion. Depreciation would have occurred irrespective
of whether any improvements were made to the mortgaged property.
The two items, improvements and depreciation, are therefore not re-
lated and should not be combined as offsets. As discussed above, 84
depreciation is a paper transaction that does not affect the debtor rail-
road's short-term ability to pay current debts and thus should not serve
to reduce the fund available for the payment of six-months claims.
79. See note 30 supra.
80. The "pre-eminent equity" asserted by the Flournoy court consisted of a combination of
the six-months and necessity of payment rules. See 301 F.2d at 850-5 1. The claims for traffic
balances that were granted priority in Flournoy, id. at 853-56, however, did not meet the stringent
requirements of the necessity of payment rule.
81. 278 F. Supp. 592, 604 (D. Conn. 1967), aj'd, 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 999 (1969).
82. 101 Conn. 13, 125 A. 194 (1924).
83. Id. at 20-21, 125 A. at 197.
84. See text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The utility of the six-months rule has suffered from a failure by
many courts to properly analyze the basis of the rule. The rule is
designed to protect the public's interest in the continued operation of
the nation's railroads by assuring payment of operations creditors de-
spite the precarious credit position of many railroads. The courts
should not render illusory the protection offered by the rule by the ap-
plication of inappropriate accounting standards; nor should the rule's
purpose be compromised by the improper exclusion of the cost of nec-
essary new purchases, or the inappropriate inclusion of charges for
such items as depreciation. The six-months rule has not lost its rele-
vance in the one hundred years since its inception-it has merely been
misapplied.
ALAN E. KR AUS
Copyright Law--One Step Beyond Fair Use: A Direct Public
Interest Qualification Premised On The First Amendment
In keeping with the copyright clause of the United States Consti-
tution,' the purpose of the copyright statute2 is to enhance the public
welfare by promoting the growth of learning and culture.3 To accom-
plish this purpose, Congress has accorded the copyright holder certain
This Note has been entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
2. Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-
810 (West 1977)). The Copyrights Act of 1976 revised Title 17 of the United States Code (gov-
erning copyrights) in its entirety. The new provisions became effective January 1, 1978, except §§
118, 304(b) and 801, which became effective October 19, 1976. The substantive issues discussed in
this Note concerning provisions of the former copyright statute are equally relevant to the new
provisions.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909) (copyright act intended "not pri-
marily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public"). See also Berlin
v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION-REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (Comm.
Print 1961); Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 49
(1955).
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